Abstract
When sharing a task with another person that requires turn taking, as in doubles games of table tennis, performance on the
shared task is similar to performing the whole task alone. This has been taken to indicate that humans co-represent their
partner’s task share, as if it were their own. Task co-representation allows prediction of the other’s responses when it is
the other’s turn, and leads to response conflict in joint interference tasks. However, data from our lab cast doubt on the
view that task co-representation and resulting response conflict are the only or even primary source of effects observed in
task sharing. Recent findings furthermore suggest another potential source of interference in joint task performance that
has been neglected so far: Self-other discrimination and conflict related to agent identification (i.e., determining whether
it is “my” or the other’s turn). Based on these findings we propose that participants might not always co-represent what their partner is supposed to do, but instead co-represent that another agent is responsible for part of the task, and when it is his turn. We call this account the actor co-representation account.
shared task is similar to performing the whole task alone. This has been taken to indicate that humans co-represent their
partner’s task share, as if it were their own. Task co-representation allows prediction of the other’s responses when it is
the other’s turn, and leads to response conflict in joint interference tasks. However, data from our lab cast doubt on the
view that task co-representation and resulting response conflict are the only or even primary source of effects observed in
task sharing. Recent findings furthermore suggest another potential source of interference in joint task performance that
has been neglected so far: Self-other discrimination and conflict related to agent identification (i.e., determining whether
it is “my” or the other’s turn). Based on these findings we propose that participants might not always co-represent what their partner is supposed to do, but instead co-represent that another agent is responsible for part of the task, and when it is his turn. We call this account the actor co-representation account.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-26
- DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0057-0
- Authors
- Dorit Wenke, Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstrasse 1a, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
- Silke Atmaca, Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstrasse 1a, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
- Antje Holländer, Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstrasse 1a, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
- Roman Liepelt, Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstrasse 1a, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
- Pamela Baess, Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstrasse 1a, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
- Wolfgang Prinz, Department of Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Stephanstrasse 1a, 04103 Leipzig, Germany
- Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Online ISSN 1878-5166
- Print ISSN 1878-5158