Abstract
To subscribe to the embodied mind (or embodiment) framework is to reject the view that an individual’s mind is realized by
her brain alone. As Clark (2008a) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According
to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s brain and her non-neural bodily anatomy. According
to EM, an embodied mind is a threeplace relation between an individual’s brain, her non-neural body and her non-bodily environment.
I argue that BC can be given a weak and a strong interpretation, according to whether it accepts a functionalist account of
the contribution of the non-neural body to higher cognitive functions and a computational account of the contents of concepts
and the nature of conceptual processing. Thus, weak BC amounts to an incomplete version of EM. To accept a weak BC approach
to concepts is to accept concept-empiricism. I raise four challenges for concept-empiricism and argue that what is widely
taken as evidence for concept-empiricism from recent cognitive neuroscience could only vindicate weak BC if it could be shown
that the non-neural body, far from being a tool at the service of the mind/brain, could be constitutive of the mind. If correct,
EM would seem able to vindicate the claim that both bodily and non-bodily tools are constitutive of an individual’s mind.
I scrutinize the basic arguments for EM and argue that they fail. This failure backfires on weak BC. One option left for advocates
of BC is to endorse a strong, more controversial, BC approach to concepts.
her brain alone. As Clark (2008a) has argued, there are two ways to subscribe to embodiment: bodycentrism (BC) and the extended mind (EM) thesis. According
to BC, an embodied mind is a two-place relation between an individual’s brain and her non-neural bodily anatomy. According
to EM, an embodied mind is a threeplace relation between an individual’s brain, her non-neural body and her non-bodily environment.
I argue that BC can be given a weak and a strong interpretation, according to whether it accepts a functionalist account of
the contribution of the non-neural body to higher cognitive functions and a computational account of the contents of concepts
and the nature of conceptual processing. Thus, weak BC amounts to an incomplete version of EM. To accept a weak BC approach
to concepts is to accept concept-empiricism. I raise four challenges for concept-empiricism and argue that what is widely
taken as evidence for concept-empiricism from recent cognitive neuroscience could only vindicate weak BC if it could be shown
that the non-neural body, far from being a tool at the service of the mind/brain, could be constitutive of the mind. If correct,
EM would seem able to vindicate the claim that both bodily and non-bodily tools are constitutive of an individual’s mind.
I scrutinize the basic arguments for EM and argue that they fail. This failure backfires on weak BC. One option left for advocates
of BC is to endorse a strong, more controversial, BC approach to concepts.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-19
- DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0087-2
- Authors
- Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod, ENS/EHESS/CNRS, Paris, France
- Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Online ISSN 1878-5166
- Print ISSN 1878-5158