Abstract
The present work deals with an initiative that aims at creating and promoting rural development through high quality. It is
called “Presidia”, it has been started by the Slowfood movement, and it relies on an approach to rural economies different
from the standard spreading of industrialization. The phenomenon on focus is based upon the cooperative dynamics of several
small producers, and thus some criticalities typical of social dilemmas have emerged in the case-based study on the field:
they deal with the role played by cooperation-supporting institutions. Through an empirically grounded agent-based model which
allows what-if analysis of some policy suggestions, different mechanisms for promoting cooperation among producers are thus
investigated. Simulation results outline how single altruistic actions are not capable of sustaining a positive aggregate
while single selfish choices can determine very negative outcomes, and how only the strong commitment of most central actors
can protect the system from random fluctuations in cooperation levels. Two main results are finally discussed: informal control
mechanisms do not ensure the desired level of cooperation and high quality; interaction structure codetermines the outcome.
called “Presidia”, it has been started by the Slowfood movement, and it relies on an approach to rural economies different
from the standard spreading of industrialization. The phenomenon on focus is based upon the cooperative dynamics of several
small producers, and thus some criticalities typical of social dilemmas have emerged in the case-based study on the field:
they deal with the role played by cooperation-supporting institutions. Through an empirically grounded agent-based model which
allows what-if analysis of some policy suggestions, different mechanisms for promoting cooperation among producers are thus
investigated. Simulation results outline how single altruistic actions are not capable of sustaining a positive aggregate
while single selfish choices can determine very negative outcomes, and how only the strong commitment of most central actors
can protect the system from random fluctuations in cooperation levels. Two main results are finally discussed: informal control
mechanisms do not ensure the desired level of cooperation and high quality; interaction structure codetermines the outcome.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-13
- DOI 10.1007/s11299-011-0090-9
- Authors
- Riccardo Boero, Department of Economics and Public Finance “G. Prato”, University of Torino, Corso Unione Sovietica 218/bis, 10134 Torino, Italy
- Journal Mind & Society
- Online ISSN 1860-1839
- Print ISSN 1593-7879