Abstract
Reverse Inference (RI) is an imaging-based type of inference from brain states to mental states, which has become highly widespread in neuroscience,
most especially in neuroeconomics. Recent critical studies of RI may be taken to show that, if cautiously used, RI can help
achieve research goals that may be difficult to achieve by way of behavior-based procedures alone. But can RI exceed the limits of these procedures and achieve research
goals that are impossible for them to achieve alone? By way of answering this question we show that a conception of the mind—type identity—under which
the answer is in the positive, is untenable for reasons that strongly support another conception of the mind—functionalism—under
which the answer must be in the negative. On this basis we then conclude that RI cannot exceed the limits of behavior-based
procedures in cognitive psychology.
most especially in neuroeconomics. Recent critical studies of RI may be taken to show that, if cautiously used, RI can help
achieve research goals that may be difficult to achieve by way of behavior-based procedures alone. But can RI exceed the limits of these procedures and achieve research
goals that are impossible for them to achieve alone? By way of answering this question we show that a conception of the mind—type identity—under which
the answer is in the positive, is untenable for reasons that strongly support another conception of the mind—functionalism—under
which the answer must be in the negative. On this basis we then conclude that RI cannot exceed the limits of behavior-based
procedures in cognitive psychology.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-24
- DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0063-2
- Authors
- Yakir Levin, Department of Philosophy, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, 81405 Israel
- Itzhak Aharon, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Making, Hebrew University, Giv’at Ram, Jerusalem, 91904 Israel
- Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Online ISSN 1878-5166
- Print ISSN 1878-5158