Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 45(4), Nov 2025, 377-392; doi:10.1037/teo0000270
Molyneux’s question (MQ) asks whether the newly sighted—previously capable of identifying objects via touch—would prove capable of identifying those same objects by vision alone. If the newly sighted can visually identify objects, then the ability to form mental representations of some important properties seemingly occurs prior to experience. However, I argue that MQ really seeks to determine whether perception is inherently multisensory rather than whether the ideas underlying perception are innate. I begin by reviewing arguments against the idea that representing objects across different modalities via a “common code” is sufficient for a “yes” response to MQ. I then argue that “innateness” enters the picture by positing that cross-modal connections, in conjunction with a common code, are necessary for a “yes” response to MQ. Finally, I discuss implications for expanding tests of MQ to include other modalities and experimental settings that assess established multisensory integration phenomena. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)