Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 45(3), Aug 2025, 195-210; doi:10.1037/teo0000271
This article argues for an understanding of theory that has lost its once more prominent role in psychology. In recent decades, theory has been reduced to the formulation of models that are taken to be little more than specific explanations of particular experimental findings or patterns in quantitative data sets. We argue that for psychology to be taken seriously as a human science, theory must serve a more fundamental function in the discipline. Theory must offer an account of what really is “the case” (i.e., the truth) about our human being-in-the-world. Further, theory must serve another equally vital function in the discipline because truth—the aim of any theory—necessarily involves the articulation of meaningful implications and, thereby, captures the evaluative element at the heart of any truth claims. Thus, we argue psychological theory, qua theory, rather than as a mere model, has something to say about truth and about ethics. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)