Abstract
Motivation
National Human Rights Action Plans (NHRAPs) turn state commitments to human rights into policy. Despite their widespread implementation internationally, they remain little studied and there is limited consensus as to their effectiveness.
Purpose
This article addresses this by using a political economy model to develop a framework to evaluate the success of NHRAPs. Within this framework it is argued that capacity, political structure, and political consensus are key drivers in the design and implementation of NHRAPs. We hypothesize that a country is likely to design and effectively use an NHRAP in policy-making if at least these three requirements are met: (1) they are built on political consensus; (2) their perceived political benefits exceed their costs; and (3) governments have adequate resources to design and implement them.
Approach and methods
We evaluate this hypothesis using Chile as a case study. In 2016, Chile enacted a national law mandating NHRAPs. Since then, the country has adopted two NHRAPs: one spanning 2018–2021 and another covering 2022–2025.
Findings
None of the three stipulated requirements were met in Chile. There was deep polarization rather than consensus building; the political costs of implementing an NHRAP exceeded the benefits; and key government bodies in Chile lacked the personnel and mandate to implement NHRAPs.
Policy implications
This study advances our understanding of the nuances of designing public policies for human rights, and the complex political costs associated with them. Unless political actors are committed to investing political capital and resources, it is unlikely that these plans will succeed. Our political economy framework can be replicated across multiple national action plans, countries, and contexts. Future studies can identify contributing conditions that can mitigate political costs, increasing the likelihood of the success of these plans.