Global Social Policy, Ahead of Print.
In communities of Sub-Saharan Africa, where local elites participate in the selection of households for cash transfers, there is a tendency to deviate from laid down rules for various reasons. Using qualitative data from selected districts where Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme is implemented, this study investigates the reasons why district and community elites deviate from prescribed selection processes of the LEAP programme. Drawing on the concept of competitive clientelism, the findings suggest that elites are deeply guided by political patronage to fulfil one primary goal, protecting their role in office. Such ambition is facilitated by the discretionary power accorded to elites by the local government system and socio-cultural values deeply rooted in Ghanaian society. In conclusion, the study draws out key lessons from the analysis and suggests a design of beneficiary selection frameworks that acknowledges the nature of domestic politics, institutions of power and powerful actors at the subnational level. The article also highlights the implications of the findings for the broad politics of social protection literature.