Peace agreements that follow political negotiations to resolve protracted conflict often include various commitments to political and constitutional reform to address the underlying causes of the conflict. These commitments are often based on negotiated compromises that enable the parties to the conflict and the agreement to persuade their respective constituencies that at least some of their basic aspirations have not been abandoned and that their realization will be achieved through other means. There are inevitably spoilers on both sides who see the commitments in the agreement, and possibly even the agreement itself, as unacceptable. Introducing constitutional reform to fulfil these commitments has to navigate between these two obstacles: the expectations generated by the peace agreement and its promise of change, on the one hand, and, on the other, the stubborn resistance of the spoilers who often feel threatened by the change agenda. In light of the above, an interesting debate surfaces about the timelines for change. One school of thought suggests that post-peace agreement constitution making provides a constitutional moment which has to be seized in order to introduce and consolidate radical change. Another school of thought suggests that, as it is unlikely that there will be a consensus on a new vision for the country, an incremental approach is necessary where the difficult issues (which are often the most important issues for parties seeking change) are deferred until later.