The (Limited) Space for Justice in Social Animals

While differentialists deny that non-linguistic animals can have a sense of justice, assimilationists credit some animals
with such an advanced moral attitude. We approach this debate from a philosophical perspective. First, we outline the history
of the notion of justice in philosophy and how various facets of that notion play a role in contemporary empirical investigations
of justice among humans. On this basis, we develop a scheme for the elements of justice-relevant situations and for criteria
of justice that should be fruitful in studying both humans and animals. Furthermore, we investigate the conceptual connections
between a sense of justice, on the one hand, and various other mental powers, on the other, and indicate which of the latter
may be beyond the ken of animals. Next, we consider recent empirical research on justice-related phenomena in animals. We
argue for an intermediate position: While animals can at least in principle satisfy some preconditions of justice (intentional
action, rule-following), others are problematic, notably possessing a notion of desert. A space for justice in social animals
exists, yet it is rather limited compared to the rich cultures of justice in humans. Finally, we reflect on some actual or
alleged implications of research on animal justice. As regards justice in humans, one should avoid a simplistic image of “natural
justice” as boiling down to equal allocation of goods. As regards justice for animals, one should be weary of the contractualist assumption that only those capable of justice themselves are deserving
of “just” treatment.