Abstract
A peer worker is introduced in a controlled labor market experiment characterized by unobservable effort and incomplete contracts.
Workers make decisions independently and without knowledge of each other’s actions in a modified gift exchange experiment.
Introducing a peer worker into an ongoing market has a negative and significant effect on effort. This decrease in effort
is consistent with responsibility-alleviation on the part of employees and not with other-regarding equity concerns for the
manager’s payoffs.
Workers make decisions independently and without knowledge of each other’s actions in a modified gift exchange experiment.
Introducing a peer worker into an ongoing market has a negative and significant effect on effort. This decrease in effort
is consistent with responsibility-alleviation on the part of employees and not with other-regarding equity concerns for the
manager’s payoffs.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-17
- DOI 10.1007/s12122-012-9138-9
- Authors
- Mark F. Owens, Department of Economics and Finance, Middle Tennessee State University, Box 27, Murfreesboro, TN 37132, USA
- Journal Journal of Labor Research
- Online ISSN 1936-4768
- Print ISSN 0195-3613