Abstract
This paper uses Social Security earnings records linked to data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine the labor
market behavior of rejected and accepted disability applicants prior to their application. We find that rejected applicants
have substantially lower earnings and labor force participation rates during the decade prior to application than beneficiaries.
Also, we find some evidence of a divergence between these groups, with rejected applicants leaving the labor force at a faster
rate than beneficiaries as their application date approaches. One interpretation of these results is that the disability screening
process on average separates those who are at least partially motivated by adverse economic circumstances when applying for
disability benefits from other applicants.
market behavior of rejected and accepted disability applicants prior to their application. We find that rejected applicants
have substantially lower earnings and labor force participation rates during the decade prior to application than beneficiaries.
Also, we find some evidence of a divergence between these groups, with rejected applicants leaving the labor force at a faster
rate than beneficiaries as their application date approaches. One interpretation of these results is that the disability screening
process on average separates those who are at least partially motivated by adverse economic circumstances when applying for
disability benefits from other applicants.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-17
- DOI 10.1007/s12122-011-9110-0
- Authors
- Seth H. Giertz, Deparment of Economics, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, CBA 368, P.O. Box 880489, Lincoln, NE 68588, USA
- Jeffrey D. Kubik, Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University, 426 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244-1020, USA
- Journal Journal of Labor Research
- Online ISSN 1936-4768
- Print ISSN 0195-3613