Abstract
This paper presents a general procedure for decomposing income inequality measures by income sources. The methods of decomposition
proposed are based on the Shapley value and extensions of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games. In
particular, we find that Owen’s value can find an interesting application in this context.We show that the axiomatization
by the potential of Hart and Mas-Colell remains valid in the presence of the domain restriction of inequality indices. We
also examine the properties of these decomposition rules and perform a comparison with Shorrocks’ decomposition rule properties.
proposed are based on the Shapley value and extensions of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games. In
particular, we find that Owen’s value can find an interesting application in this context.We show that the axiomatization
by the potential of Hart and Mas-Colell remains valid in the presence of the domain restriction of inequality indices. We
also examine the properties of these decomposition rules and perform a comparison with Shorrocks’ decomposition rule properties.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-16
- DOI 10.1007/s10888-011-9207-y
- Authors
- Frédéric Chantreuil, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, UFR des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, Campus 4, 17 rue Claude Bloch, BP 5186, 14032 Caen cedex 5, France
- Alain Trannoy, AMSE, EHESS, Vieille Charité, 2, rue de la Charité, 13002 Marseille, France
- Journal Journal of Economic Inequality
- Online ISSN 1573-8701
- Print ISSN 1569-1721