Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the conceptual connections between happiness and well-being. It first distinguishes episodic
happiness from happiness in the personal attribute sense. It then evaluates two recent proposals about the connection between
happiness and well-being: (1) the idea that episodic happiness and well-being both have the same fundamental determinants,
so that a person is well-off to a particular degree in virtue of the fact that they are happy to that degree, and (2) the
idea that happiness in the personal attribute sense can serve as a “proxy” for well-being, i.e., that a person’s degree of
deep or robust happiness approximates their degree of well-being. It is argued that happiness in both these senses is conceptually,
metaphysically, and empirically distinct from well-being. A new analysis of welfare, well-being as agential flourishing, can
explain welfare’s real connection to happiness in both the episodic and personal attribute senses. It predicts that such happiness
is only directly beneficial when it is valued, when it is a form of valuing, or when it underwrites (i.e., serves as the causal
basis for) the disposition to realize one’s values. It is therefore a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for especially
high levels of well-being. This analysis of welfare integrates many insights from the eudaimonic tradition of welfare and
happiness research in psychology, and also addresses common criticisms of these eudaimonic models.
happiness from happiness in the personal attribute sense. It then evaluates two recent proposals about the connection between
happiness and well-being: (1) the idea that episodic happiness and well-being both have the same fundamental determinants,
so that a person is well-off to a particular degree in virtue of the fact that they are happy to that degree, and (2) the
idea that happiness in the personal attribute sense can serve as a “proxy” for well-being, i.e., that a person’s degree of
deep or robust happiness approximates their degree of well-being. It is argued that happiness in both these senses is conceptually,
metaphysically, and empirically distinct from well-being. A new analysis of welfare, well-being as agential flourishing, can
explain welfare’s real connection to happiness in both the episodic and personal attribute senses. It predicts that such happiness
is only directly beneficial when it is valued, when it is a form of valuing, or when it underwrites (i.e., serves as the causal
basis for) the disposition to realize one’s values. It is therefore a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for especially
high levels of well-being. This analysis of welfare integrates many insights from the eudaimonic tradition of welfare and
happiness research in psychology, and also addresses common criticisms of these eudaimonic models.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Category Research Paper
- Pages 1-25
- DOI 10.1007/s10902-011-9309-z
- Authors
- Jason R. Raibley, Department of Philosophy, California State University, 1250 Bellflower Blvd, Long Beach, CA 90840, USA
- Journal Journal of Happiness Studies
- Online ISSN 1573-7780
- Print ISSN 1389-4978