Abstract
According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article
we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit
counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called
‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model.
Finally, we explore a different way to make sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances.
we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit
counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called
‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model.
Finally, we explore a different way to make sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-19
- DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0072-1
- Authors
- Leon de Bruin, Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr-University of Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
- Derek Strijbos, Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, 6500 HD Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Marc Slors, Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, 6500 HD Nijmegen, The Netherlands
- Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Online ISSN 1878-5166
- Print ISSN 1878-5158