Abstract
The purpose of this article is to develop a theory which frames the demands of civil society in such a way as to better enable
corporate subjects to manage and navigate ‘irregular’ engagement from activist organizations. Activist NGOs engage in advocacy
at times by mounting, facilitating or encouraging popular social campaigns and actions against targeted corporations. In many
cases, radical ‘direct action’ tactics are adopted, taking such approaches, NGOs may capitalise on the broader, more ethically
diverse strategic possibilities open to them than are available to their corporate adversaries. We employ institutional theory
to map out this asymmetric distribution of strategic possibility. We theorise NGOs and corporate subjects as effectively ‘competing’
with one another to maximise their own strategic possibilities and to minimise those of their opponents, in the perennial
battle for hearts and minds that plays out between NGOs, corporate subjects, and broader civil society actors who ultimately
determine boundary rules for NGO-corporate conflict. Within this context we explore the normative challenge arising from the
possibility that corporate subjects might seek to tip the competitive balance by learning from how the military has adapted
to successfully engage with ‘irregular’ adversaries through what is often termed ‘asymmetric’ or ‘irregular’ warfare. Should
corporations follow a similar adaptive process, by mirroring the ‘irregular’ strategies of activist groups? Drawing evidence
from the military experience, we suggest—perhaps counter intuitively—that such adaptations can create new opportunities for
conflict resolution and for building sustainable cooperation between former adversaries.
corporate subjects to manage and navigate ‘irregular’ engagement from activist organizations. Activist NGOs engage in advocacy
at times by mounting, facilitating or encouraging popular social campaigns and actions against targeted corporations. In many
cases, radical ‘direct action’ tactics are adopted, taking such approaches, NGOs may capitalise on the broader, more ethically
diverse strategic possibilities open to them than are available to their corporate adversaries. We employ institutional theory
to map out this asymmetric distribution of strategic possibility. We theorise NGOs and corporate subjects as effectively ‘competing’
with one another to maximise their own strategic possibilities and to minimise those of their opponents, in the perennial
battle for hearts and minds that plays out between NGOs, corporate subjects, and broader civil society actors who ultimately
determine boundary rules for NGO-corporate conflict. Within this context we explore the normative challenge arising from the
possibility that corporate subjects might seek to tip the competitive balance by learning from how the military has adapted
to successfully engage with ‘irregular’ adversaries through what is often termed ‘asymmetric’ or ‘irregular’ warfare. Should
corporations follow a similar adaptive process, by mirroring the ‘irregular’ strategies of activist groups? Drawing evidence
from the military experience, we suggest—perhaps counter intuitively—that such adaptations can create new opportunities for
conflict resolution and for building sustainable cooperation between former adversaries.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Category Original Paper
- Pages 1-21
- DOI 10.1007/s11266-011-9205-5
- Authors
- Alasdair Marshall, School of Management, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ UK
- Richard Telofski, The Kahuna Institute, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
- Udechukwu Ojiako, School of Management, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ UK
- Maxwell Chipulu, School of Management, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ UK
- Journal Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations
- Online ISSN 1573-7888
- Print ISSN 0957-8765