ABSTRACT
Objective
This study investigates the conditions under which authoritarian regimes increase public goods provision. The research posits that authoritarian regimes are more likely to provide public goods when they possess both the motivation, stemming from the adoption of multiparty elections, and the capacity, which includes extractive, administrative, and coercive capabilities.
Methods
Empirical analysis is conducted on a panel of 95 authoritarian regimes between 1970 and 2015 using the Driscoll-Kraay estimator. Two robustness tests are performed.
Results
The findings reveal that the introduction of a competitive party system in an authoritarian regime is negatively associated with public goods provision. However, authoritarian regimes with state capacity reaching the 75th percentile are significantly more likely to prioritize broad public goods in their budget allocation when adopting multiparty elections.
Conclusions
This study suggests that while the adoption of multiparty elections might incentivize authoritarian regimes, the requirement for these regimes to respond effectively to such institutional changes is the capacity to do so. The study contributes to the understanding of the interplay between democratic institutions and state capacity in authoritarian contexts, providing an explanation of within-regime variables and demonstrating how pre-existing differences influence policy outcomes.