ABSTRACT
This study examines how the state apparatus can be mobilized by central governments for the purpose of poverty alleviation without undermining local knowledge and initiative, engaging directly with James Scott’s critique of top-down modernization schemes. Using county-level panel data from 706 nationally designated poor counties (NPCs) in China between 2012 and 2018, we identify the separate and combined effects of two key mobilization tools deployed during China’s recent poverty-alleviation campaign: quantitative poverty-reduction targets and changes to cadre performance evaluations that prioritized poverty outcomes over GDP growth. A difference-in-differences design shows that both policies boosted rural per capita incomes, with effects conditioned by target difficulty, cadre career horizons, and local tenure. From these results, we identify three features that enhanced effectiveness: (1) granular identification systems enabling precise, monitorable goals; (2) incentive realignment toward redistribution; and (3) stability in local leadership to accumulate and apply local knowledge. These findings highlight a governance model that combines central coordination with locally attuned implementation, offering practical lessons for other developing countries seeking to design centrally driven, target-oriented mobilization strategies while mitigating the risks of overreach.