Pregnancy and mereology: when there is no analogy

While Devanesan1 argues that any particular mereological view of pregnancy does not determine the correct stance on a moral question, he also argues that our mereological commitments restrict how we can argue for our conclusions. I agree but reject the assumption that may underlie this, that metaphysics should have priority in our moral determinations. Settled metaphysical commitments restrict how we can argue for moral conclusions, but settled moral conclusions properly shape our understanding of our metaphysical commitments.

I will briefly discuss the status of the debate in mereology of pregnancy before returning to Devanesan’s argument. Where A is the pregnant woman or personⁱ and B is the fetus, according to Devanesan, there are four possible mereological relationships that could apply: ‘A might be a proper part of B, B might be a proper part of A, A and B might be disjoint (disconnected) or A and B…

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