Transplantation sits at the boundary of modern medicine, ethics, and social collaboration. The ability to recover one individual’s vital organs to save or markedly improve the life of another creates tension between the utilitarian goal of optimising organ failure treatment and individual patients’ deontological rights. This conflict is largely unique to organ transplantation and distinct from nearly all other medical practices, warranting discrete rules and individual consideration. The dead donor rule (DDR) functions to protect vulnerable individuals and populations from transplant-motivated exploitation, avoid conflicts of interest, and promote trust in the vital enterprise of transplantation. While we believe the DDR deserves thoughtful reconsideration, any criticism or proposed amendment of the rule must acknowledge the uniqueness of organ donation and the rule’s fundamental aims.
In ‘Non-consequentialist and egalitarian objections to the dead donor rule,’ the author misrepresents the DDR’s underlying justifications, divorcing the rule from its crucial context.