Abstract
Motivation
The European Union (EU) has played a key role as a major contributor, providing over USD 13 billion in development assistance to Afghanistan. This study re-evaluates two decades of European development assistance (EDA) from the perspectives of Afghan recipients.
Purpose
It examines why the EU failed to achieve Afghan state-building goals through the EDA, providing nuanced insights into the challenges faced.
Approach and Methods
The study draws on 20 semi-structured interviews conducted with former Afghan government officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organization (CSO) representatives, complemented by primary sources from the Afghan government, the EU, and the academic literature.
Findings
The results revealed both positive outcomes and challenges. Factors that contribute to state-building failure include fragmented donor strategies, lack of accountability, and ineffective checks and balances. Over-reliance on off-budget aid without UN coordination was the main critical shortcoming, causing the duplication of projects. Additionally, in the context of conflicting interests and differing goals among donors, including the EU, the Afghan government’s role reduced to that of a bystander. As such, Afghans experienced a lack of autonomy and ownership, which compromised the potential to effectively coordinate reconstruction and state-building efforts.
Policy Implications
Future EU engagement with Afghanistan or similar post-conflict countries should prioritise balanced allocation of on- and off-budget aid for effective long-term development and stability. The EU should support the UN as the primary aid coordinator to minimize duplication and align resources with recipient priorities. To enhance transparency in channelling off-budget aid via NGOs, a tripartite audit mechanism involving the UN, recipient government, and donors would prevent capital flight, curb corruption and reduce wastage of resources.