This article examines judicial anti-corruption campaigns, which are time-bound episodes of intensified enforcement of corruption and abuse of office legal provisions against political elites. Based on a synthesis of comparative research, the authors argue that these campaigns are inherently political events, driven by the strategic choices of judges, prosecutors, and politicians. Relying on cross-regional empirical evidence from Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the article highlights the significant variation in campaign transparency and effectiveness across individual campaigns and across regime types. Although some initiatives genuinely enhance the rule of law, others provide only a façade of accountability or serve as weaponized instruments of partisan competition and elite purges. Campaign outcomes range from strengthened state capacity and lower corruption to unintended negative effects, such as administrative paralysis, political cynicism, and populist backlash. Ultimately, the article provides a framework for understanding why some campaigns succeed as accountability instruments while others undermine the democratic or institutional goals that they ostensibly aim to promote.