Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, Vol 45(1), Feb 2025, 3-24; doi:10.1037/teo0000278
Over twenty-five years ago, Enright et al. (1998) challenged scholars regarding the social scientific study of forgiveness. They used the term “definitional drift” to anticipate that the definition of forgiveness would undergo changes to such an extent that perhaps the construct of forgiveness would become distorted. That prediction has come true as there are myriad definitions of forgiveness, with the lament by some scholars that the lack of clarity regarding the definition of forgiveness is hindering scientific advancement in this important field. To clear up the confusion regarding what the essence of forgiveness is, we use the philosophical method of Aristotelian classical realism to define forgiveness. We then examine eight different views in the published literature, starting from 2013 and working up to 2023, to show the divergence, and actual philosophical errors, regarding what scholars are saying about what forgiveness is. Those eight conceptualizations of forgiveness include the following: (1) forgiveness as a split between decisions and emotions; (2) forgiveness as centered on the regulation of emotions only; (3) forgiveness as reducing only in negative reactions (whether that is affect, cognition, behavior, or any combination of these); (4) forgiveness as a split between state and trait characteristics; (5) forgiveness as motivational aspects only; (6) forgiving situations such as tornadoes; (7) other categories rarely specified; and (8) comprehensive forgiveness: reductions in negative affect, cognition, and behavior and the increase in positive aspects of these toward the offender. The philosophical errors are critiqued, and the way forward is suggested. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)