This article challenges the myriad criticisms of humanistic psychology’s scientific status by directly confronting their common underlying claim: that humanistic psychology lacks an adequately empirical epistemological underpinning. Aristotelian epistemology is shown to be foundational to humanistic psychology’s approach to the empirical in contradistinction to the tradition of positivistic empirical psychology, the epistemological roots of which lie primarily in atomism. Core characteristics of humanistic psychology’s approach to the empirical are explicated from an account of Aristotelian epistemology as revived and elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas. The explication is brought to fruition by way of an illustration using Edmund Husserl, one of humanistic psychology’s primary progenitors, as an example. The analyses herein find humanistic psychology’s empirical epistemological underpinning to emphasize (a) the confluence of the a priori and a posteriori; (b) the qualitative structure of knowledge; (c) formative meaning bestowal; (d) situated knowing; (e) intentional, presentational grounding; (f) imaginative presence to phenomena; (g) intuitive insight into essences; and (h) bracketing the naturalistic assumptions of positivistic empirical psychology. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)