Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States

Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have
a ‘theory of mind’. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people’s mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form
this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the ‘Direct Perception approach to social
cognition’. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people’s mental states. It opposes traditional views
on two counts: by claiming that mental states are observable and by claiming that we can attribute them to others without
the need for a theory of mind. This paper argues that there are two readings of the direct perception claims: a strong and
a weak one. The Theory-theory is compatible with the weak version but not the strong one. The paper argues that the strong
version of direct perception is untenable, drawing on evidence from the mirror neuron literature and arguments from the philosophy
of science and perception to support this claim. It suggests that one traditional ‘theory of mind’ view, the ‘Theory-theory’
view, is compatible with the claim that mental states are observable, and concludes that direct perception views do not offer
a viable alternative to theory of mind approaches to social cognition.