Embodying the Mind and Representing the Body

Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation
depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction
of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body
representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that
either put weight on the explanatory role of the body itself or body representations. We further analyse how and to what extent
body representations can be said to be embodied. Finally, we give an overview of the full volume articulated around foundational
issues (How should we define the notion of embodiment? To what extent and in what sense is embodiment compatible with representationalism?
To what extent and in what sense are sensorimotor approaches similar to behaviourism?) and their applications in several cognitive
domains (perception, concepts, selfhood, social cognition).