Abstract
Accounts of act individuation have attempted to capture peoples’ pre-theoretic intuitions. Donald Davidson has argued that
a multitude of action descriptions designate only one act, while Alvin Goldman has averred that each action description refers
to a distinct act. Following on recent empirical studies, I subject these accounts of act individuation to experimentation.
The data indicate that people distinguish between actions differently depending upon the moral valence of the outcomes. Thus,
the assumption that a single account of act individuation applies invariantly seems mistaken.
a multitude of action descriptions designate only one act, while Alvin Goldman has averred that each action description refers
to a distinct act. Following on recent empirical studies, I subject these accounts of act individuation to experimentation.
The data indicate that people distinguish between actions differently depending upon the moral valence of the outcomes. Thus,
the assumption that a single account of act individuation applies invariantly seems mistaken.
- Content Type Journal Article
- Pages 1-14
- DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0096-1
- Authors
- Joseph Ulatowski, Department of Philosophy, University of Wyoming, Dept. 3392, 1000 E. University Avenue, Laramie, WY 82071, USA
- Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Online ISSN 1878-5166
- Print ISSN 1878-5158